He is suspicious of any attempt to attribute the Nazi atrocities either to certain peculiar convolutions of German his- tory or to the moral indifference and latent anti-Semitism of ordinary Germans. This is where transnational perspectives meet post-colonial perspectives in understanding mass dictatorship. Holocaust should not be reduced to another peculiarity of the German colonialism.
More broadly, one cannot miss the history of a primitive accumulation, full of conquest, enslavement, augmentation mammaire prix maroc occasion, murder and all forms of violence in the making of the modern nation-state.
The post-colonial type of mass dictatorship, such as the developmental dictatorship in South Korea, provides a vivid example. The answer is not that simple. What if the majority tyrannise minorities?
Is that democ- racy or is it dictatorship? Arguably, the cliché that dictatorship was imposed by a wilful minority upon a confused majority cannot with- stand historical scrutiny.
A history of modern colonies reveals that, in certain contexts, settler democracies have been more murderous than authoritarian colonial governments. It opened the road to the massacre of Tutsis. If mass democracy means rule by the ordinary people, mass dictator- ship presupposes the transformation of the chaotic crowd of ordinary people into a disciplined uniform mass, a collective characterised by its homogeneous identity, unitary will and common goal.
However, a disciplined uniformity and homogeneous collectivity of the masses is imaginary. In so far as the imaginary homogeneous collectivity is per- ceived among the masses, it remains effective. Very often, it is not the reality itself, but the interpreted reality that shapes the thoughts and practice of the many in their everyday lives. The blurring of demarcations between dictatorship and democracy in a transnational history of mass dictatorship leads us to rethink domi- nation, violence, coercion and other means of repression.
The most virulent and penetrating forms of domination were therefore to be found in those systems where the appearance of freedom and rationality were greatest. Neither of these regimes reached perfection, but both had been driven by an unstinting effort to perform that revolution. Once launched, however, the anthropological revolution shifted from revolutionary mass movements to institutionalised mass politics. If the consent of high Stalinism was fed by the fever of anthropological revolu- tion, post-Stalinist regimes depended on shared guilt or public complic- ity for mass consent.
Generally speaking, East European people in the post era just adapted themselves to the system without volunteering enthusiasm for the state project, and the regime was obliged to rest content with such merely passive consent. According to Andrzej Walicki, the de-Stalinisation of marked a turning point from totalitarianism to authoritarianism.
A re-engagement with Antonio Gramsci can complement this analy- sis, since his conceptualisation of hegemony helps us to problematise the self- or voluntary mobilisation of the masses. Under the scrutiny of the concept of hegemony, the organisation of consent cannot be equated simply with the process of moulding public opinion.
Popular consent was not just imposed by the state terror and all-pervasive propaganda. It was important to inspire self-motivation among the masses.
Mapping Mass Dictatorship : Towards a Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Dictatorship
What one cannot fail to note in mass dic- tatorship is an experiment in plebiscitary democracy which served to legitimise the regime. Fascist hegemony, entrenched in the grassroots, often attempts to penetrate into the private sphere of individuals.
What distinguishes mass dictatorship from mass democracy is the extreme way in which the former achieves paroxysmal perpetration. Mass dictatorship shares similar mechanisms for constructing the image of a people of unitary will and action with other forms of the modern nation-state. Nazi culture as a contemporary allegory of intolerance, existential extremity and radical evil was in a sense the tragic culmination of enlightened sci- ence and rationality.
If disciplinary society constructs a capillary network of apparatuses to produce and regulate customs, habits, habitus and practices, bio-power regulates social life from its interior. Power can achieve effective command over the entire life of the population at the birth of bio-power. The fascist aesthetics of the beautiful male body may be one indicator of the dimension of bio-politics in mass dictatorship, as furnishing a bridge between the public and private sphere.
In fact mass dictatorship regimes deployed the bio-politics of sexuality not less than mass democracy. Mass dictatorship as a working hypothesis pays due attention to the intellectual history of popular sovereignty.
Popular sovereignty transformed populations from passive subjects into active citizens and thus paved the way for participatory dictatorship. Instead, it is the nation that now has the legislative power to make constitutions. Here we wish to move beyond the ideas that democratic regimes necessarily contribute to strengthening democracy abroad and that authoritarian regimes only draw inspiration from their peers, and adopt a more fine-grained view of the relation between the two strategies.
This requires attention first to the dynamics of transnational circulation of government knowledge between different types of regimes, and second to the professionals that label regimes, defend or fight them, particularly on the international level.
We will therefore analyse the actors, forms and contents of the promotion of democratic and authoritarian practices as well as the effects and blind spots of these efforts along several lines. While democracy promotion has become a major professional market since the Cold War Guilhot,it peaked in the s. This undertaking is embedded within broader, international-level dynamics of political and social engineering regarding conflict management and resolution, State reform and human rights advocacy.
In this research area, we propose to study those who evaluate and promote democracy. This will require analysing the expansion and professionalisation of the market of indicators and rankings of degrees of democracy and the emergence of specialised expertise in election observation. Emphasis will be laid on the various professionals active in this labelling.
Special attention will be devoted to symbolic and political struggles and to the fallout from these rankings. Another way to rethink the opposition between democracy and authoritarianism consists in investigating the transnational circulation of political regulation schemes and practices.
It is worth considering the ways in which this aid and its technical forms may be reproduced or subverted. While the international dimension is clearly important, the transnational circulation of professionals and apparatuses and the contents of the practices being promoted deserve further investigation.
Emphasis will be placed on discursive and ideological outputs and on the mobilisation of symbols and authoritarian pasts. Legitimation discourses and apparatuses should also be checked against their uses in practice. Hybrid attempts at legitimating the authorities in place by simultaneous recourse to democratic practices elections, limited participatory mechanisms see Allal, and authoritarian ideological constructs are found in various areas — North Africa, Turkey, Latin American and Central European countries.
These three research areas are in no way exclusive, and should serve as guidelines. We welcome proposals based on original and theoretically grounded empirical research, whose social science dimension must be explicit political science, sociology, anthropology…. Proposals will be written in French and English and total words max. Historical studies of the institutions and practices of criminal repression in twentieth-century authoritarian regimes are invariably confronted with two interrelated problems.
The first concerns the demarcation of the thus defined socio-political universes. Here let us limit ourselves to noting that, after World War I, a number of societies shared comparable features in state and juridical-penal organization. Whether we speak of Italian Fascismof the Portuguese Estado Novothe Spanish Francoist regimethe Romanian National Legionary Stateand the Vargas Estado Novo period in Brazilamong others, we are faced with concepts that were intended to establish a new state-based order and a new relationship between the state and the individual.
The second pro